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IN OTHER PUBLICATIONS

Aid To Education
Readers of the October 4 issue of The
Commonweal were treated to an interesting
article on federal aid for higher education
by Professor Edwin H. Rutkowski of the
University of Detroit.
The House of Representatives last year
refused to insert into its higher education
bill any scholarship aid. Too many representatives felt that working one's way
through college is a democratic and character-building opportunity we cannot afford
to destroy. The Senate in turn refused in its
own bill to include construction grants, as
distinguished from loans, for colleges and
universities. Feelings ran high that grants,
because they would go also to the Churchrelated higher educational institutions, initiated a new method of assistance that was
forbidden under the first amendment.
The conference committee between the
legislative chambers might have chosen the
easiest way out by dropping both of these
features from the joint bill it finally submitted. But the consequences would have
been clearly undesirable. The elimination of
grants would have disadvantaged public
institutions, most of which would run into
legal difficulties in attempting to finance repayment of loans. The elimination of scholarships would have disadvantaged private
colleges, where tuition is high relative to the
public-supported schools. Further, scholar-

ship grants to individual students have the
merit of almost unequivocal constitutionality, the mammoth precedent here being the
highly successful G.I. Bill of World War II,
under which veterans exercised the right of
free choice in obtaining the kind of education they wanted, in public, private nondenominational, or private Church-related
schools.
But for any program intended realistically to promote advanced study in this
country, both public and all types of private
colleges and universities must be supported
because of the massive area occupied by
the private sector of higher education. Private institutions comprise almost 62% of
the total number of colleges and universities
in this country, enroll 40% of the students
in such schools, grant 45% of all degrees,
and award 48% of all graduate degrees.
And again of all higher educational institutions, 39% are Church-related: 23% Protestant, 16% Catholic.
The results of the conference committee's
decision to include both scholarships and
grants in its bill are well known. The Senate
accepted the compromise over the strong
objections of such leaders as Lister Hill, the
powerful chairman of his chamber's standing committee dealing with education, who
had been one of the opposing conferees.
When the House's turn came to consider
the conference report, the interjection of
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the scholarship program, and the flaring up
of previously calmed anxieties over the
Church-State problem - suddenly provoked
by individual telegrams to each representative from the National Education Association and by Senator Hill's personal
intervention with the southern delegation brought death to the bill on a motion to
recommit.
Examining this year's bill from the House,
Professor Rutkowski observes that the
House has again kept scholarships out, but
with a promise to make such direct student
aid a part of a revised National Defense
Education Act. The Senate's work is still in
committee, and scholarships remain a part
of an omnibus education bill. But it is too
early to draw any conclusions about whether
the upper chamber will again directly link
up scholarships with its proposals for construction of higher educational facilities, or
defer them to other measures. In any case,
any realistic expectation of final congressional behavior regarding federal aid to
higher education must take scholarship proposals into account as, among other contributions, an answer to the question of how
aid may constitutionally be extended to
Church-related private colleges and universities.
With respect to the Church-State problem itself, it was a majority of the House,
not the Senate, that last year abruptly
boggled over the conference committee's
allowance of construction grants to Churchrelated colleges and universities. How did
representatives view, and hear viewed, the
matter this year in passing a bill with such
provisions?
Two principal arguments were put forth
in defense of assisting the construction of
facilities for Church-related higher education. First of all, had not Congress long ago
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settled the question in favor of granting aid
to such schools? In support of this contention, Representative Adam Clayton Powell
of New York, the chairman of the Education and Labor Committee, entered into the
record the details of no less than thirty-two
federal programs under which educational
institutions with religious affiliation received
funds through grants or loans authorized
and appropriated by Congress.
The second argument in behalf of the
bill's inclusion of Church-related institutions
was surely the more difficult one. A legislative practice of many years standing may
well indicate what Congress has determined
is constitutionally permissible, but under the
American system of an ever-possible judicial
review the constitutional question is always
fair game in hunting grounds outside the
legislature. In denying that the first amendment forbids federal aid for the construction
of facilities in Church-related institutions of
higher education, the second argument
stresses the fact of an essential difference
between education in the elementary and
secondary levels on the one hand, and colleges and universities on the other. In the
words of Representative Robert N. Giaimo
of Connecticut, we render education in the
United States a disservice if we commingle
the "two entirely different problems." As
Representative Fernand J. St. Germaine of
Rhode Island put it, the burden of the first
amendment's prohibition is quite clear on
the lower school area, but not at all so in
respect to the "very fuzzy area" of higher
education.
In asserting or at least suggesting the
existence of the basic distinction, these
representatives were in effect repeating what
even strong critics of federal aid to parochial
schools were willing to acknowledge. During
the hearings held on the question earlier in
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the year, spokesmen for the National
Council of Churches and the notorious - on
this issue, at any rate - National Education
Association admitted the plausibility of the
argument that, in the words of one of them,
"the religious coloration of private colleges
was sufficiently different from that in parochial schools" to warrant support for some
type of aid to Church-related colleges.
Civil Rights
The public accommodations section of
the President's Civil Rights Bill is discussed
at length in the current issue of Interracial
Review by Robert Drinan, S.J., Dean of
Boston College Law School. Observing that
even the most optimistic frequently express
serious doubt about the possibility of the
enactment of this section (Title II) of President Kennedy's Civil Rights Bill, Father
Drinan nevertheless feels very strongly
about it. In his opinion, the section, which
would desegregate hotels, theatres, restaurants and similar facilities is probably the
most important and the most needed of the
Administration's five-point civil rights package. Its enactment in 1963 could change the
face of the South; its defeat could open up a
new era of massive demonstrations in which
the Negroes of the South would, unaided by
the law, work for equality of access to privately owned public facilities.
According to Father Drinan the overwhelming urgency of Title II makes it important to discuss several issues involved
in this attempt to desegregate the nation's
public accommodations - the thrust and the
justification of the Kennedy proposal and
the consequences if Congress fails to enact
a measure designed to desegregate privately
owned but publicly licensed facilities.
It seems fair to say that the basic legal
struggle to desegregate publicly owned and

publicly operated facilities has been won.
The integration of schools, public parks and
other tax-supported institutions may be
agonizingly slow, but the law at least is
moving in one clear direction.
There is, however, really no law as yet
with regard to the vast world of privately
owned public accommodations in the South.
The United States Supreme Court will
probably make clearer in due course its unmistakable feeling that state or municipal
trespass laws may not be employed to perpetuate a "white-only" policy followed by
hotels, theatres and restaurants. But aside
from the Supreme Court opinions on the
"sit-ins" there exists no clear-cut legal directives concerning the rights of non-white
citizens to enjoy the hospitality of public
accommodations that are privately owned.
It is important to note, on the other hand,
that no valid legal mandate exists anywhere
which gives the right to motel keepers, for
example, to refuse all eligible Negro guests.
Such a law would be unconstitutional on its
face.
The presumption of law is indeed that any
merchant who receives a license to conduct
a place of public accommodation is bound
by the ancient common-law obligation of
the innkeeper to extend hospitality to every
wayfarer. Into this solid legal tradition, respected for centuries in the Anglo-American
world by innkeepers and their associates, the
southern mentality has inserted the exception of the Negro. This deviation from the
traditional and accepted role of the innkeeper and the restaurateur has been in the
South a privately sanctioned arrangement
and has never had or could have the blessing of a state or federal law.
Title II of the Kennedy Civil Rights Act
seeks, therefore, not to erase any statutory
provisions which legally permit southern
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owners of public accommodations to serve
whites alone. The bill seeks rather to affirm
that Negro citizens of the United States have
a right to federal protection from a privately
invented bias which would preclude them
from the accommodations to which by common law they are entitled.
The public accommodations section of
the Kennedy Civil Rights Bill is virtually
the same as the Civil Rights Act passed by
Congress in 1875 and unfortunately invalidated by the Supreme Court a few years
thereafter. But the reasons of the Court at
that time - or rather its assumptions based
on racism - have long since become obsolete.
Father Drinan predicts that if no federal
law on this question is enacted it is clear
that some of the following consequences
will occur:
(1) We can expect ever increasing massive "sit-ins" in hotels, theatres, dining
places and in all other similar facilities. The
"sit-ins" will perdure until there is "voluntary desegregation." There is every reason
to believe that this technique will in the
future be just as effective as it has been in
the past - probably more so.
(2) It seems likely that the United States
Supreme Court will tend, as it has in the
past, to fill in the void in declared public
policy, by asserting and enforcing the right
of Negroes to equality in the enjoyment of
privately operated public facilities. The Supreme Court will not thereby be "usurping"
any powers reserved to the states or to individuals, but will be simply spelling out and
implementing the pre-existing right of every
citizen to be treated as an equal with respect
to his eligibility for public accommodations.
(3) Legal theories about the "public"
nature of "public accommodations" will be
.developed as Negro groups litigate in south-
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ern states. It would seem clear that the management of a licensed facility designed to
serve the public as a body cannot select its
invitees on the basis of race or color. After
all, all citizens, white and colored, pay for
the licensing and the health, police and fire
protection given to the licensed establishment; on this narrow basis at least the Negro
citizen has a right to be treated as an equal.
(4) Possibly the most serious consequence of the defeat of Title II would be a
deepening and an intensification of that feeling of frustration on the part of Negroes
which has produced the revolt of 1963. In
a year in which as never before Negroes
finally secured the attention of the white
majority, a defeat of the law that is more
needed than any other would be a psychological blow of the most serious nature for
the entire Negro community.
(5) If the Civil Rights Act of 1963 provokes a filibuster in the Congress, the result
may be not merely a new revolt among the
nation's 21 million Negroes but a revolt in
Congress itself. The truly intolerable fact
that 12 of the Senate's 19 committees and
13 of the House's 21 committees are chaired
by southerners could conceivably produce
a revolt in the nation's legislative branch
against the archaic seniority rule which
permits two-thirds of all congressional
committees to be headed by southern congressmen, virtually all of whom are the
enemies of civil rights legislation.
Church-State
In wake of the recent reports from Rome
that the American bishops are seeking a
clarification of the Church-State issue from
the Ecumenical Council, an article in the
September 1963 issue of Victorian makes
interesting reading. Entitled "An American
Catholic Ponders the Church-State Issue,"
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the article by Michael Novak discusses five
basic lessons which the American experiment has taught observers.
The first is that the American arrangement has its roots in a lesson learned from
the religious strife of Europe. That lesson
taught us that State and citizens should not
be in conflict over affairs of religious conscience; the State should not demand what
the citizens might not conscientiously accept. Where the Prince or the national law
had imposed a religion, bitterness and constraints were often the result; many Americans first fled Europe on that account. The
American solution, then, has been to detach
the State from competence in deciding questions of religious affiliation. This solution
does not mean that the body of citizens are
irreligious. Rather, it means that the State
is not the organ of religion, but that the citizens, alone or in a body, have the guaranteed freedoms of conscience and religious
assembly to carry out fully their individual
and corporate religious life.
The second principle is a defense of the
view that true religion lives in the minds
and wills of religious people; it is there that
faith and charity take root and from there
that they animate external action. No State
official, or group, or party, can make a religious decision for a man. Only if his will
truly adheres to it is a decision really his.
Something similar is true of a man's understanding. Nobody can understand for him.
They can give him words to repeat or actions
to perform, but only he can really make the
act of understanding which converts these
words or actions into a part of himself. Both
on the side of will and on the side of understanding, moral responsibility is centered in
the person, in his own consciousness - and
not in the State or party. A man's freedom
to maintain this center of consciousness in-

violate is guaranteed in the Bill of Rights.
It is this freedom that gives the Catholic
Church and Catholics free room to work in
their most cherished realm.
The third principle is the recognition of
a fact - a fact which holds true in America
and in the whole world in general. It is the
fact of pluralism. There are many religions.
Modem communications have destroyed, or
are destroying isolation. Few are the places
now where there is only one belief or, at
lest, where more than one has not been
heard of and thought about. The fact is that
consciences are divided, and on a worldwide scale. The assumption must be that
people everywhere are in good faith, until
bad faith is proved. And hence, in conjunction with the first principle, which keeps the
State from imposing any particular faith
upon its people, this third principle recognizes the mysterious designs of God. Not all
people believe; all remain in the freedom of
their good faith.
The fourth principle tries to express the
different way, then, that the task of the State
towards its citizens has come to be conceived. At one time, the State, or rather the
Head of State, looked upon himself as a
kind of father to his people. His decisions
were rather unchecked by a legislature representing the opinions of the people. The
people were poorly educated and relatively
helpless before ideas and forces that were
urged upon them.
Now, citizens are organized and educated.
They get their own ideas and pursue their
own courses of action. The State has come
to be but one apparatus by which they pursue their aims. It is rather an instrument
than a personified father and guide. In the
old way, the Head of State looked upon the
religion of his subjects as the father of a
family looks upon that of his children: he
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expected his people to follow, he exhorted,
and he punished. But now the Head of a
democracy is not a father; it is assumed that
his subjects have the freedom, education,
and means to make their own decisions in
religion. The State, instrument rather than
father, now tries to emulate the neutrality
which God Himself seems to take to human
freedom, letting His rain fall on the just
and the unjust. And, finally, the conditions
for this modern instrumental idea of the
State are not met in all lands; the education
and organization of the people are not always sufficiently advanced to support a nonpaternalism's final aim not to perpetuate
itself, but to supplant itself as thoroughly as
possible.
The fifth principle of the American arrangement attempts to express the basic outlook, the point of view, from which the other
principles and their practical working out
have grown. It maintains that political
principles derive validity not from a world
of ideas or of abstractions, not from an
ideology, but from intelligibility verified in
facts. This means that neither beautiful
ideals nor brute facts can guide political
judgment, but rather, whatever possibilities
and rational courses of action there are within the facts. Thus, for example, it would be
well if Church and State got along smoothly,
if there were never any conflicts or quarrels
about jurisdiction, if religious truth automatically impressed itself on all consciences
and unified all men immediately, and
freely in one body. But in fact not all men
do receive the truth, not all hear it correctly,
and not all even hear it; furthermore, countries where the union of Church and State
has swayed in one way or another do not
have a very good record of peace or freedom - even for the Church. Hence, the
designers of the American arrangement de-
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siring neither to create an ideal unity nor to
set Church and State wrestling over the cold
facts of power, tried to create a way of
checks and balances in which the best possible reasonability in the circumstances
might come to be. They detached the competence of the State from religious mattters;
they detached the use of the State from the
hands of any Church. The fifth principle
tries to point out the critical approach to
politics: neither the idealism of Plato's Republic nor the Realpolitik of Bismarck, Napoleon, and the rest but the study both of
facts and of the greatest possible meaning
that can be obtained from them.
Mr. Novak observes further that Pope
John's Pacem in Terris has given Americans
hope that their experience of liberty of conscience has been assimilated by the Church
as a new lesson from the centuries, a new
glory to the working out of the Gospels in
human history, a new contribution from the
New World to the Old. A great deal of thinking must yet be done as the Church enters
an uncertain and changing future, a great
deal of theological-political thinking, and
especially on the movement towards a world
as distinct from a national order. For the
Pope has set mankind a new goal. Having
reached a solution favoring freedom in the
relation of persons, nation, and Church, man
must now ask: What is the relation of persons, nations, world, and Church? If much
of this thinking is not done by Americans,
from the vantage point of their unique and
rich experience, a great loss will be felt to
the Church Universal. American Catholics
must awaken at one and the same time, to
a consciousness of themselves as unique,
and to a consciousness of their place in a
universal view of history and space.
Natural Law
Not often are our American writers fea-
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tured in European publications. Particularly
is this true in the area of legal philosophy.
One exception, of course, is Miriam Theresa
Rooney, former Dean of Seton Hall Law
School, and presently Professor of Law,
whose very excellent article on the nature
of the general principles of law was recently
featured in the March 1963 issue of World
Justice, (published under the auspices of the
Louvain University).
Professor Rooney's article is written in
an attempt to explain the import of Article
38 (C) of the Statute establishing the International Court of Justice. According to the
article, the law to be applied by the judges
includes "the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations."
According to Professor Rooney the pervading error in modern thinking about law
is the unwarranted identification of law with
force. It is not new but more widely accepted
now. Machiavelli had once described so
accurately the way some strong men gained
power that his own name became synonymous with the ruthlessness and double-dealing he had observed in practice. Thomas
Hobbes, born within earshot of the gunfire
off England during the battle with the Spanish Armada, never got over his sense of
terror at the display of might possible to
sovereign powers. His description of Leviathan, so influential upon Bentham, Austin,
and Holmes, among others, in the commonlaw system, was matched by the work of the
intellectuals who wrote in justification of the
reign of terror in France, and of Machtpolitik for the Germans. With the reliance
on military forces to support theories of
communism among the Soviets and the dependence on armed troops to make socialism prevail with the Nazis, especially when
called forth by apparently constitutional
means, millions of people have come to

dread the screaming siren, the knock on the
door, and ration cards as the voice of the
law. Instead of turning with confidence to
the courts on the local as well as international levels for the peaceful settlement of
claims, the rational order has become inverted until force comes first to mind instead of last, as it did with Bracton, Aquinas
and More.
False philosophical principles, which
seem so obvious when they are eventually
pointed out, often go undetected for centuries until a shocking effect becomes widespread, and millions cry out in one voice to
question how they were led so far astray.
That is the situation now. All over the world
people are asking in increasing volume for
justice, for recognition of their right to assent or dissent, for participation in what
Professor Myres McDougal calls a universal
order of human dignity. Equality of opportunity, equality of representation, and equality of bargaining power, are different ways
of expressing these wants. All find place,
not in materialism nor conceptualism, not
in positivism nor subjectivism, not in nominalism nor solidarism, nor any similarly
fallacious theory, no matter how well expressed, but rather in the balanced philosophy of modern realism which is perennially
acclaimed and which provides the basic
principles implicit in the common-law systen. The dignity of the human being, his
distinctively spiritual quality of power to
reason, and his capacity to make responsible choices, still conform to all our scientific
observations of the laws of nature. The
sooner our philosophical system is rewritten
in modern language to make these existent
relationships clear, the sooner the juridical
order will be able to resume its proper function of ensuring justice and re-establishing
peace.
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The general principles of law recognized
by civilized nations which are needed on
the world level to facilitate communication
and trade, can be spelled out in various
ways. Professor Rooney states that among
them may be included:
Men are reasonable beings having limited
intellectual power and freedom to choose.
Men live in the society of other men.
Minimum standards of conduct are required to live in society successfully.
No man should be judge in his own cause.
(Submission to third party judgment.)
Opportunity to be heard (including the day
in court) is required.
There must be jurisdiction to hear and decide.
Hearing pleas from both sides is essential.
Evidence must be properly admissible.
There must be an impartial judge (with no
conflict of interests of his own).
And an independent and courageous judiciary (free from outside pressures).
There is presumption of good faith (clean
hands).
Fairness and consistency are expected.
Reasoned argument is the means of persuasion.
Reliance on force is the last resort, not the
first.
Respect for legal order must be maintained
for the common good.
Professor Rooney concludes that there
are many others, perhaps too numerous
ever to list completely, but the effort helps
to concentrate attention by making the
implicit a bit more explicit. They call for
universal respect to the extent that they recognize the universal consciousness of a need
for self-determination, responsibility, and
dignity. To make them effective is the function of the legal profession. Comparison of
specific procedures is helpful, but of greater
importance is the development of a sound
method of confronting common juridical
problems. The greatest need of all is the
re-establishment in everyone's mind that
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law is concerned with justice, not uncontrollable power. Then it will be possible to
see that peace is the work of justice and
that world peace is possible only through
law. Who is there to lead in making this
clear except those who know the law and
serve it.
Insanity Defense
Readers of the symposium on "Mental
Disease and Criminal Responsibility" which
was featured in The Catholic Lawyer issues
of Autumn 1958 and Spring 1959 will recall
the heated controversy between the opponents and proponents of the M'Naghten
Rule.
The October 1963 issue of the American
Bar Association Journal features an article
by Professor Jerome Hall dealing with the
Rule. Responding to overt and implied
criticism of the M'Naghten Rule for determining legal insanity to excuse criminal
responsibility, Professor Hall proposes a
national seminar or study by judges of the
diverse and perplexing problems they must
face in deciding issues in this field. He
thinks that M'Naghten needs repair rather
than replacement and that a rough consensus might be attainable.
The Professor suggests the following program of a seminar group to permit such a
study. No preference is implied as to the
order of studying the various problems and
their formulation is not wholly neutral since
the purpose is, also, to raise questions regarding current criticism of the M'Naghten
Rule.
1. What are the principal meanings of
"disease?" Is mental illness like physical
illness, or is it so different from it that even
a very wide analogy is misleading?
2. What is "science?" Is there an intermediate type of knowledge between science,
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rigorously defined, and common sense?
Where should psychiatry be placed, e.g.,
what of statements by leading psychiatrists
to the effect that psychiatry is an art? What
evidence is there that psychiatrists (a) cure
mental illness, (b) diagnose it correctly, (c)
can recognize that persons who have not
committed any harm are socially dangerous,
and (d) can accurately predict that certain
individuals will commit crimes if they are
released from hospitals or penal institutions?
3. What is an expert, e.g., does that term
imply that there is a body of knowledge with
reference to which all or most "experts"
agree? What is the basis of the position
taken by some social scientists that psychiatry has not yet developed to the point where
psychiatrists should be permitted to testify
in court as experts? What are the principal
types or schools of psychiatry, and what is
the significance of divergent diagnoses?
What does this imply regarding the common assumption that psychiatrists are expert in classifying certain persons as "psychotic" or "insane?" If these terms mean
extreme and irrational deviation from social
norms, for instance, being a social nuisance,
is such labeling by a psychiatrist more or
less sound than that by an intelligent jury?
4. Does psychiatry include expert skill in
elucidating such terms as "right," "freedom," "justice," "punishment" and "responsibility?" What is the special competence
of psychiatrists? What is the significance
of a deterministic premise when employed
(a) in physical science, (b) in psychiatric
research, (c) in therapy, and (d) in deciding whether a person should be held
criminally responsible for a harm he committed?
5. The history of legal tests of insanity
should be explored to ascertain their rela-

tionship to the contemporaneous medical
and psychiatric knowledge, moral ideas and
views of "human nature" and, also, to evaluate certain recent statements, e.g., that the
M'Naghten Rule was merely the product
of political pressure, that a "wild beast" test
was never actually a rule of law in England
in the implied literal sense, and that lawyers
have usually impeded the march of scientific progress while doctors have facilitated it.
6. Important, also, is a comparative study
of American, English and Continental law,
especially with reference to the "irresistible
impulse" test as a complete alternative to
the cognitive (M'Naghten) test. On what
grounds has the Report of the Royal Commission, 1949-1953, so highly praised in
this country by critics of M'Naghten, been
criticized by English judges, for instance,
Justice Devlin? In the study of the Continental codes, the meaning of the word "or"
needs to be scrutinized to determine whether
its significance is disjunctive or conjunctive.
Continental cases should be studied to determine whether the position so vigorously
urged here by very articulate psychiatrists
- that a person's cognitive faculties may be
quite normal or even superior but, nonetheless, he may be unable to keep from committing the most serious harms -is actually accepted in European law. If it is found
to be recognized to some extent, is this the
effect of the early nineteenth-century psychology of separate faculties, which has
been everywhere discarded, or is it currently
supported by able European psychiatrists?
7. In the study of such social problems,
the most difficult question often is: What is
the question or the proposal that is made?
This requires logical analysis of various
arguments. For example, is it consistent
with the psychology of integrated personality (that man functions as a unit) to argue
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that M'Naghten should be abandoned? Is it
consistent with that theory of psychology to
argue that the volitional function can be
seriously disordered, but, at the same time,
the cognitive functions remain normal? Is
it consistent to assert that psychiatry does
not deal with human freedom, right and
wrong, responsibility, and justice, and to
assert also that the right-and-wrong test is
a vestige of superstition and that psychotic
persons understand the difference between
right and wrong? Logical inquiry can also
disclose the areas where no assured answer
can be given to certain questions, e.g.,
whether punishment deters, whether psychiatrists can rehabilitate criminals, and so
on. If "experts" in behavioral disciplines
and psychiatrists do not have all the desired
answers, what is the role of intelligent laymen in dealing with such problems, and
what of the legal and ethical standards developed by thoughtful persons in the course
of many centuries?
8. The characteristics and requirements
of a democratic legal order should be
studied especially in relation to the role of
unfettered officials, unfettered experts and
unfettered juries. Are the prevailing conceptions of human nature, individual responsibility, freedom, right and wrong, as
traditionally expressed in the rules of law
which guide judges and juries, to be subordinated to the theories of psychiatrists
and, if so, to which ones - Freudian, neoFreudian, anti-Freudian, Jungian, Adlerite,
existentialist, organicist, neurologist, Reikian, Frommian, or eclectic? Should the
selected experts be permitted to present any
theories or opinions to juries who receive no
guidance from judges or laws?
9. There are still unsettled questions
about "punishments" to be studied; they
involve questions of public policy, ethics
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and free discussion. There are distinctions
to be drawn between reforms, utopias and
the relation of punishment to freedom and
social responsibility. There are issues which
concern hospitalization and punishment,
e.g., when is a "hospital" a penitentiary?
And again, if we cannot determine whether
punishment deters or whether experts can
rehabilitate offenders, what is the status of
so-called "retributive" punishment?
10. Finally, efforts might be made to
formulate conclusions reached at the end
of the inquiry, which, presumably, would
correctly and precisely reflect the various
positions held at that time. Evidently, also,
some of the topics and some of the methods
of analysis indicated above would be dealt
with or employed at several meetings.
Sunday Laws
The constitutionality of Sabbatarian exemptions to Sunday Closing Laws is discussed at length in a scholarly note in the
Summer 1963 issue of The Boston University Law Review.
At first glance, there would not appear
to be any doubt as to the validity of Sabbatarian exemptions, since Mr. Chief Justice
Warren, in Braunfeld v. Brown,' said in regard to them: "A number of States provide
such an exemption, and this may well be
the wiser solution to the problem. But our
concern is not with the wisdom of legislation but with its constitutional limitation."
Can legislation, seemingly sanctioned by
the Court one day, be declared unconstitutional the next? This would not .be impossible, for in Braunfeld, the validity of a
Sabbatarian clause was not in issue. Hence,
the Chief Justice's statement was obiter
dictum, rather than an evaluation of con' 366 U. S. 599 (1961).

